The decisive trio

It was the clearest of confessions. When Vladimir Putin said last Thursday, 23 November: Donald Trump is “an intelligent man who already has a lot of experience. I think he will find a solution”, this sycophancy was obviously a cry for help.

Almost three years after trying to get his hands on Ukraine, the Russian president still only controls a fifth of the country, including Crimea. He has also lost the Kursk region, from which he has been unable to dislodge the Ukrainian troops. He is so afraid of calling a general mobilisation that he ended up resorting to using North Korean troops, while food prices soar, air traffic is reduced due to a lack of spare parts and Russian interest rates continue to rise.

Vladimir Putin is brandishing his nuclear weapons, but his only hope – as he has just admitted – is that Donald Trump will help him get out of the trap he has got himself into.

It is therefore highly likely that these men will negotiate a compromise that the Ukrainians will simply have to endorse. Volodymyr Zelenski is so aware of this that he has just declared that the only way the Ukrainians would be able to give up the re-conquest of their lost territories is if NATO opened its doors to them. Donald Trump will refuse because he does not want to commit to protecting them. Vladimir Putin will not accept it either because it would be an admission of defeat, but both could envisage the European Union guaranteeing Ukraine’s security by deploying troops along the future demarcation line.

In the coming year or months, perhaps even before the American president takes office, the EU will have to make an existential choice.

Either it will want to take up this political, logistical and financial challenge, or it will declare itself materially and even politically incapable of doing so. Either it will assert itself as a player on the international stage, guaranteeing its own security, the protection of the amputated Ukraine and the stability of the continent, or it will shirk the responsibilities that will fall to it the moment the United States turns its back on Europe.

For the European Union, the moment of truth is approaching and the debate will be lively in the 27 capitals as well as in London. Why risk sending our forces to confront Russia? – some will ask. Why spend so much on this troop deployment when we are all strapped for cash? – many others will say. How can we agree to take such a step towards political union without even debating it,’ the outraged Eurosceptics, Europhobes and Eurominimalists will protest.

Russia will intervene massively in this debate, while Donald Trump will do his utmost to weaken one side in order to win over the other. This moment of truth will be so difficult that the outcome is unpredictable, but three men should carry decisive weight.

The first is Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, whose country is investing heavily in its military capabilities and who has himself been at the forefront of calls for the Union to stand up to Vladimir Putin by developing a common defence.

The second is Friedrich Merz, the Christian Democrat who is expected to become chancellor after the German elections on 23 February. In favour of borrowing, developing a European defence system and taking a firmer stance against Vladimir Putin, Friedrich Merz is likely to lead a coalition that is keen to assert the Union’s political position.

As for the third man, Emmanuel Macron, he has taken a very hard line against Vladimir Putin and can only re-establish himself on the French stage if he puts himself at the forefront of the international scene. The French president could prepare a new “Sorbonne speech” after the German elections, setting out the Union’s geopolitical priorities. He could already consult Donald Tusk and Friedrich Merz to ensure that their views coincide, paving the way for a Franco-German-Polish call for Europe to secure the demarcation line between the two Ukraines. The UK and the majority of member states would respond positively. Gradually, almost the whole Union would follow suit. In this way, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin would have taken the common defence of a political union out of limbo.

(Photos: Wikimedia Commons, © European Parliament 2019, 2022)

Harris or Trump, it is time for Europe

“If it’s Harris, you’ll see”, people will have said a lot by Tuesday, “the Europeans will be so relieved to have escaped Trump that they’ll start believing in the American umbrella again, and won’t talk about developing a common Defense any more”.

“If it’s Trump, you’ll see”, people will have said everywhere, “many will try to negotiate bilaterally to keep a sort of American protection for themselves, and that will be the end of any idea of European strategic autonomy, possibly even of the Union itself”.

Harris or Trump, there is nothing unlikely about the European Union asserting itself as an autonomous political power. The whole Union is almost unanimously in favour of this, and the most convincing signs are that the next Commission will include Commissioners for Defence and the Mediterranean.

Within 100 days, the former will have to submit a report proposing an industrial and financial strategy to equip the Union with common military capabilities. The latter will have to lay the foundations for genuine co-development between the two shores of the Mediterranean lake, in order to reduce Europe’s industrial dependence on China, create jobs in Africa and reduce migratory flows.

In both cases, the Union intends to take on a political dimension on its eastern and southern flanks while, on its western flank, bridging the gap with the United States, a desire that goes back 8 years already, however new it may seem. In 2016, on the evening of Donald Trump’s election, the most Atlanticist of Europeans fell flat on their faces as they saw a man arrive at the White House who had campaigned by casting doubt on the United States’ commitment to defending Europe.

The necessity of a common European defence became clear to everyone. A taboo was broken, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine precipitated joint action as it drove the 27 to empty their arsenals to help the Ukrainians to face up to the situation, and then to buy their ammunition together in order to lower prices and harmonize their armaments.

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was behind this decision, and she will now take charge of European diplomacy. The future Defence Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, is a former Lithuanian Prime Minister. On the need for a European Defence, there is today a convergence of views between France and the countries that have left the Soviet bloc, and it is so profound that the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has just declared that, Trump or Harris, the future of Europe depended first and foremost on the Europeans, because “the era for geopolitical outsourcing is over”.

Yet we cannot rule out the possibility that the pessimists are right.

Europe’s poor financial state could stand in the way of common military investment by the 27. Mrs Le Pen could come to power in France. The international situation may deteriorate at a much faster pace than Europe’s political assertion takes hold. Absolutely nothing is certain, but Harris or Trump, the United States’ retreat is so profound, and Europe’s desire for political re-emergence so convincing, that even a country like Taiwan wants to move closer to the Union.

Last week alone, the democratic China welcomed three parliamentary delegations from Europe, including one from the European Parliament. Half-heartedly and sometimes clearly, the country’s most senior officials made it clear to us that they needed a strong Europe, because they could no longer rely on the United States alone. “We are the Ukraine of Asia”, some students told me ¬¬- the Ukraine from which the United States is on the verge of turning away, the Ukraine where the fate of Europe is at stake, just as that of Asia will be played out in Taiwan.

(Photo: Michael Vadon, Joe Biden @ Flickr)